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Who Let the Dogs Out—and While
We’re at It, Who Said They Could
Sniff Me?
HOW THE UNREGULATED STREET SNIFF
THREATENS PEDESTRIANS’ PRIVACY RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
Jane Doe left her office at the same time as usual. She
walked three blocks south, turned right at the deli, and walked
four blocks west. She was happy to be walking home—earlier it
was raining and she was forced to take the crowded bus. The
streets were busy, even for rush hour, and she was too distracted
to see who was around her. As she waited on the corner for the
“don’t walk” sign to change, she suddenly felt something press
against her leg. Turning quickly, she saw the snout of a police
dog and a human officer standing right behind it. Before she
realized what was happening, the dog stopped sniffing and sat
down, and the officer asked her to step aside. Having never
committed a crime in her life, she was scared. She followed the
officer a few feet away, where he conducted a search of her body,
clothes, and purse. After several minutes, the officer apologized,
turned, and walked away—his pup trailing behind him.
What Jane Doe did not realize is that she had just been
sniffed and searched for drugs. The dog’s sitting down indicated to
its human partner that it had detected an illegal substance, and
the human officer’s search followed. However, Jane Doe was not
carrying drugs at all. Perhaps the dog alerted because during her
bus trip earlier in the day, she had been sitting beside someone
who had recently used marijuana. Perhaps the smell lingered.
Perhaps the human officer simply picked her at random and
wanted to see what he could find. Perhaps the dog did not smell
anything, and instead, provided its human partner with a false
alert. Should any of these explanations afford Jane Doe any less
of a right to privacy on her person? Should her expectation to this
privacy be reduced merely because a dog was involved?
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These questions—which inquire into the degree of
protection afforded via privacy rights—have been posed for years
as the Fourth Amendment case law has developed. The Fourth
Amendment affords people privacy rights in their “persons,
houses, papers, and effects” against searches and seizures that
are not supported by probable cause.1 Throughout the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries, the Supreme Court has worked to
develop a comprehensive understanding of the vague terms
“search” and “seizure.”2 The Court has struggled to adopt
definitions that both maintain the tradition of privacy and also
respond to the changing times and availability of technology. In
doing so, it has engaged in a long history of changing its
interpretation of the amendment in both scope and meaning.3
The change in scope and meaning has similarly affected
the scope of the constitutional search as compared to other stops,
such as a pat down. A public pat down requires an officer’s
reasonable suspicion as to criminal activity that he has
developed through his observations of particular events.4 A pat
down is limited to only the exterior of the body and only to
looking for specific, dangerous contraband that the officer is
reasonably suspicious is present.5 “Reasonable suspicion” is
defined as: “[a] particularized and objective basis, supported by
specific and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal
activity.”6 If the pat down, supported by reasonable suspicion,
creates probable cause that the individual has committed a
crime, an officer is permitted to seize7 that individual, and
thereby conduct a full search.8 A street seizure and search, in
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, in THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 32–37 (Cynthia Lee ed., 2011). One scholar has noted that the
Framers intended for the Fourth Amendment to create a proactive cease of unreasonable
and unjustified stops and arrests, as opposed to just an “after-the-fact remedy for
unjustified intrusions.” Id. at 34.
3 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, in THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, supra note 2, at 27, 27–31 (satirically commenting on the everchanging approach by the Court, and stating: “[w]arrants are not required—unless they
are. All searches and seizures must be grounded in probable cause—but not on Tuesdays.
And unlawfully seized evidence must be excluded whenever five votes say so.”).
4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968).
5 Id. at 24–26, 29–30.
6 Reasonable Suspicion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
7 In one case, the Supreme Court explained that a “seizure” can be understood
to mean any situation where “a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
8 Id. at 30–31 (holding that when an officer limited his pat down of a
pedestrian to trying to find dangerous weapons that may harm individuals nearby, and
he found these weapons during the pat down, he was permitted to arrest and conduct a
search of the pedestrian).
1
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turn, requires probable cause, defined as: “[a] reasonable
ground to suspect that a person has committed or is
committing a crime or that a place contains specific items
connected with a crime.”9 Determining whether an officer has
probable cause rests on a more stringent standard, as a seizure
and search is more invasive for an individual than is a stop and
a pat down. The Court, however, has held that a dog sniff does
not require either reasonable suspicion or probable cause for
the sniff to be constitutional; instead the sniff itself is what
creates the probable cause required for the officer to conduct a
constitutional seizure and search.10
The Court, however, has reduced this seemingly
limitless power of the sniff in situations where the individual is
protected by some other doctrine of Fourth Amendment privacy
rights, such as privacy within a vehicle or home.11 While the
Court has acknowledged that a pedestrian carries some level of an
expectation of privacy,12 the current unregulated street sniff regime
invades a pedestrian’s right to such a degree that it virtually
deprives her of all privacy expectations to her very person.13
Because the Supreme Court has not yet articulated
precisely what the pedestrian’s reasonable expectation of
privacy is in relation to dog sniffs, it has permitted street sniffs
to go unregulated—meaning that a dog’s alert, by itself, can
create probable cause that criminal activity is occurring,
without requiring that there be any check on the sniff before a
subsequent search is constitutional. This has left American
citizens like Jane Doe prone to fall victim to what are often

Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–10 (2005). Justice Ginsburg commented
in her dissent that she believed that this was a dangerous outcome—as the holding “clears
the way for suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of parked cars along sidewalks and
in parking lots.” Id. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
11 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616–17 (2015)
(holding that it is unconstitutional for an officer to extend a traffic stop once the purpose
for its inception is completed, so to perform a dog sniff for drugs that is not supported by
separate reasonable suspicion); see Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013)
(holding that a dog sniff on one’s front lawn is unconstitutional if conducted without first
gaining the homeowner’s permission to do so or subsequent to the officer’s obtaining of a
warrant); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979) (holding that to stop an
individual, whether or not the stop is triggered by a dog sniff, an officer must have a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring prior to performing the traffic
stop). For a complete analysis about the decisions that protect individuals from dog sniffs
in other locations, see infra Sections II.A, II.B.
12 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (stating that pedestrian Terry held privacy
rights that protected him against unreasonable searches and seizures while walking on
a street in Cleveland).
13 See infra Part III (describing the way in which a dog sniff invades one’s
reasonable expectation of privacy).
9

10
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inaccurate sniffs and false alerts.14 The sniff may be
appropriate in some cases; however, in other cases, particularly
where the sniff leads to a false alert, pedestrians’ rights may be
infringed. A dog that does not pick up the scent of drugs, yet
alerts anyway, is dangerous for an individual’s rights. Similarly,
a dog that alerts because it has detected the scent of drugs may
not be reliable, as it may be registering merely a lingering odor
due to the pedestrian’s contact with the scent at some point in
the day, as opposed to her actual possession or use of a drug.
These types of false alerts pose threats to an individual’s
expectation of privacy in public places. False alerts are often
due to training issues, mistakes, or handler cues.15 The problem
at issue is that these false alerts create probable cause and thus
allow the human officer to search individuals based upon
probable cause that should never have been formulated in the
first place. If, on the other hand, canine sniffs could be relied upon
as accurate, the fact that officers may search after an alert would
not, in itself, be problematic, as this would ensure that the
probable cause created through a canine’s alert to drugs was
reliable. Without this guarantee, however, there is no way to tell
whether or not searches stemming from a police dog’s alert are
based on more than the human partner’s mere hunch or whim—
a possibility which the Supreme Court has worked diligently to
avoid in other contexts within the Fourth Amendment.16
In order to remedy this issue, the Court or the
government must first determine the level of expectation of
privacy that pedestrians hold in relation to police dog sniffs.
The policy considerations that afford a moderate expectation of
privacy to vehicles17 should also apply to pedestrians, and
therefore, an equivalent expectation in privacy should be
extended to these more vulnerable citizens.
Once this expectation of privacy has been established, the
government should place heightened requirements on all K9
units18—specifically, through the implementation of standardized
See infra Part IV (describing the high levels of inaccuracy in police dog alerts).
See infra Part IV.
16 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (stating that pedestrian Terry held privacy
rights that protected him against unreasonable searches and seizures while walking on a
street in Cleveland, and that reasonable suspicion by an officer must be supported by
specific facts that cause the officer to believe that there is criminal activity occurring).
17 See infra
Section II.C for a complete discussion on these policy
considerations. These considerations include: the impracticability in obtaining a warrant
for a vehicle, the government’s ability to regulate vehicles, and public safety. See Mich.
Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451–52 (1990); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 368 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
18 “K-9 dog” is defined as “[a] dog trained specif[cally] to work with lawenforcement officers.” K-9 Dog, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14

15
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training and the creation of threshold accuracy requirements for
handler-canine pairs. This will establish the continuance of
accuracy for future sniff searches. Through the promise of more
accurate alerts, pedestrians would be guaranteed constitutional
searches that respect their rights. Until these heightened
requirements and standardization methods are in place to improve
accuracy, however, the government must implement a temporary
presumption against the constitutionality of these sniffs. This
would temporarily avoid the possibility that inaccurate alerts
result in searches based on unreliable probable cause.19
Part I of this note addresses the history of the dog sniff
and the policy rationales supporting the allowance of canine
sniffs. Part II discusses what the Supreme Court means when
it refers to a “reasonable expectation of privacy”20 in different
settings, while Part III explains why pedestrians are entitled to
a heightened reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes
to these street sniffs. Part IV offers insight into the problem
and highlights the consequences of unregulated street sniffs of
pedestrians, who should be granted heightened privacy rights.
Finally, Part V offers a solution which includes four crucial steps
the government must take: (1) acknowledge the pedestrians’
heightened expectation of privacy; (2) implement a temporary
presumption against street sniffs that are not supported by prior
human reasonable suspicion of illegal activity; (3) standardize
training requirements for all handler-canine pairs, which
targets the problems that cause false alerts; and (4) implement a
threshold accuracy requirement for all handler-canine pairs.
Employing this solution will guarantee that individuals are
afforded their constitutionally protected rights.
I.

THE DRUG-SNIFFING POLICE DOG AND ITS SNIFF

Canines have become an extremely integral part of the
government and police force. The use of “man’s best friend”21 to
assist in locating and tracking down particular scents has been
19 The requirements placed on the human officer are demonstrated in Terry,
which required that an officer reasonably suspect that someone is carrying a weapon—or
in this case, an illegal substance—and that this belief be based on the officer’s knowledge
and familiarity in the field. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27–29. In the event that these factors are
satisfied, the officer will be permitted to conduct a pat down of, and possibly search, the
individual only for the purposes of protecting himself or others from dangerous use of that
weapon. Id.
20 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
21 Charles F. Sloane, Dogs in War, Police Work and on Patrol, 46 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 385, 385 (1955) (commenting on the development of the close
relationship between dogs and humans).
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prevalent for the past two centuries.22 For example, the novel
Uncle Tom’s Cabin “gives a dramatic portrayal of the use of
bloodhounds in recapturing runaway slaves.”23 Even the
children’s cartoon, “Scooby Doo, Where Are You!” features Scooby
Doo, a canine detective, who helps his human friends solve
mysteries.24 The image of the investigative dog has been
incorporated in this way because of its long-standing and
important history as a member of the police force.
A.

Training the Canines

Training dogs to specialize in police investigations has an
important history of its own. The first serious attempt to train
dogs for police use began in France in 1895 and was adopted and
duplicated almost immediately by Germany in 1896.25 Germany
built upon the envisioned potential of the dog training programs
by testing various breeds of dogs to determine which were prime
for the position26 as well as by creating a police training school
for canines in Grunheide.27 After the program’s success, training
began to spread to the countries of Britain, Belgium,
Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Canada, and the
United States.28 The increased prevalence of training programs
offered the promise of more dogs entering into the “K9 force.”
At present, police academies in the United States29 invest
time, money, and energy in enlisting and training puppies to
become canine officers because of the incredible differences
between humans and dogs. A canine has a stronger sense of
smell than a human, possessing “more than 220 million olfactory
receptors30 in its nose, while humans have only 5 million.”31 This
difference explains the fact that some dogs can identify the
Id. at 385–86.
Id. at 388.
24 SCOOBY DOO, WHERE ARE YOU! (CBS Network 1969–1970).
25 Sloane, supra note 21, at 391.
26 Id. The German Shepherd was selected as the prime choice for police work
and is still the breed that is predominantly used today. Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 392–94.
29 See, e.g., Canine Unit, N.Y. STATE POLICE, https://www.troopers.ny.gov/
Specialized_Services/Canine_Unit/ [https://perma.cc/M52F-VSRU] (describing the creation
and growth of K9 units within the New York State Police Department).
30 Olfactory receptors are defined as: “protein[s] capable of binding [odor]
molecules that play[ ] a central role in the sense of smell.” Elizabeth Bernays & Reginald
Chapman, Olfactory Receptor, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/science/ol
factory-receptor [https://perma.cc/Z68W-QMP7].
31 Julio E. Correa, The Dog’s Sense of Smell, ALA. COOP. EXTENSION SYS.,
http://www.aces.edu/pubs/docs/U/UNP-0066/UNP-0066.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y8L-YNA4]
(last updated Feb. 2016).
22
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scent of drugs that have been “dissolved inside another liquid,”
that are located in the sweat on a human hand, or that have
already been deposited inside the body.32 Moreover, experiments
have shown that dogs can smell even the residue left when a bag
of drugs is rubbed against a cement wall.33 The physiological
makeup of a dog’s brain and nose, as well as its development,
allow it not only to recognize a scent but also to follow a trail,34
thereby making it a prime investigator.
While a dog’s chemical makeup suggests that it is perfect
for a life of police investigation,35 a K9 unit will nonetheless
subject the dog to intensive training procedures prior to allowing
it to join the force. Depending on what unit the canine is placed
in,36 it will be trained to detect only a few particular substances.37
Generally speaking, in the narcotics unit, training begins with
puppy toys scented with drugs.38 The dogs are trained to identify
“target odors”39—the scents of the substance that the dogs will
eventually detect—by physically pressing their noses into the
person or item to be sniffed.40 When the dog recognizes a target
odor, it is trained to “alert” to its owner of this detection by

32 These incredible traits have been attributed to Megan—a canine claimed to
be the “most successful drugs dog ever.” Jack Doyle, A Sniff Away from Retirement,
Megan the Most Successful Drugs Dog Ever Who’s Detected £30 Million of Cocaine in
Seven-Year Career, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-2541587/A-sniff-away-retirement-Megan-successful-drugs-dog-detected-30
million-cocaine-seven-year-career.html.
33 Dan Hinkel & Joe Mahr, Tribune Analysis: Drug-Sniffing Dogs in Traffic
Stops Often Wrong, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-0106/news/ct-met-canine-officers-20110105_1_drug-sniffing-dogs-alex-rothacker-drug-dog.
34 Correa, supra note 31, at 2.
35 Unfortunately for the police departments, not all dogs are born with ideal traits
for becoming a member of the K9 unit. For example, if a dog is unmotivated, sensitive to
loud noises, or not sociable, it may not be qualified for police training. Melanie Basich, K-9
Training Challenges, POLICE (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/
articles/2012/10/k-9-training-challenges.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q2KH-7AY3].
36 There are several smells that dogs can be trained to identify. Detection Dogs,
K9 GLOB. TRAINING ACAD. WORKING DOGS, k9gta.com/detection-dogs/ [https://perma.cc/C
FT5-6EYY]. Some training academies offer a wide range of areas of training. Id. For
example, the K9 Global Training Academy offers programs that train dogs to become
experts at sniffing out mines, drugs, bombs, arson, or individuals based on their trails. Id.
37 Alexandra Horowitz, The Limits of Detection, NEW YORKER (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-limits-of-detection [https://perma.cc/7V
3F-3AT9]. During the training period, “each [dog] is trained specifically on particular
molecules or compounds, and pays other odors no mind at all.” Id.
38 Jane J. Lee, Detection Dogs: Learning to Pass the Sniff Test, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 8, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/04/130407/
detection-dogs-learning-to-pass-the-sniff-test/ [https://perma.cc/N6UN-NNQU].
39 Id.
Some examples of “target odors” are “marijuana, cocaine,
methamphetamines, and heroin.” Id.
40 Because dogs cannot simply smell contraband items from across a room,
they are trained to physically press their noses into the person or personal items to be
sniffed. Horowitz, supra note 37.

1384

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:3

either sitting down or digging.41 This portion of the training
continues for six weeks, after which the dog meets its new
handler, the individual who will study the dog’s behavior, learn
to interact and understand the dog, train the dog, and who will
eventually become the dog’s partner in the field.42 Subsequent
to meeting and becoming familiar with one another, the pair
typically undergoes six additional weeks of training together.43
The training programs involve various different concentrations,
often placing handlers and the dogs in realistic scenarios where
the pair must learn how to work together and react to one
another.44 Notably, these training programs are not
standardized within or among the states—each program within
each state is free to utilize and implement its own qualification
standards for membership to the K9 force.45 For example, K9
Global Training Academy, a training center that offers various
programs for training dogs to detect different odors, maintains
that a canine and handler pair is fit to work in the field only
after the completion of a certification process, three real world
performance evaluations, and a written examination.46
Alternatively, many states do not require certification at all.47
However, though not required by law, some trainers choose to go
above and beyond to maintain the skills that the dogs and
handlers have developed. For example, Alex Rothacker, a canine
trainer, explained that even after the initial training process he
recommends that the dog-handler teams attend training
sessions twice a week to assure that the pairs remain well
trained.48 Once the handlers and their canines have formed a
partnership, the dogs become an important part of the force and
are given the credence and respect of a four-legged officer.49 The
Hinkel & Mahr, supra note 33.
Lee, supra note 38.
43 Id.
44 Training programs often list this realistic-scenario training as part of the
program. See, e.g., Drug Dog Training, K9 GLOB. TRAINING ACAD. WORKING DOGS, http://
k9gta.com/k9-services/k9-training/drug-dog-training/ [https://perma.cc/CMB7-XMKE].
45 Hinkel & Mahr, supra note 33. Notably, even when training centers
concentrate on training handlers, there are no standards for training when it comes to
interpreting a dog’s signals. Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability
of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 KY. L.J. 405, 422–23 (1996–1997). See supra note 44, for a
description of one training center’s handler training procedures. For a discussion about
the problems that result from the lack of a standardized training system throughout the
states, see infra Section V.C.
46 Drug Dog Training, supra note 44.
47 Hinkel & Mahr, supra note 33.
48 Id.
49 See, e.g., S.P. Sullivan, Photos: Four-Legged Veterans Get Salute at ‘K9
Veteran’s Day’ Event, NJ.COM (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.nj.com/bergen/index.ssf/2013/
03/four-legged_veterans_get_salute_at_k9_veterans_day_event.html [https://perma.cc/4V
S5-79KG] (posting photographs from New Jersey’s ‘K9 Veteran’s Day’ in 2013—an event
41
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Supreme Court has offered various rationales for why this
system is constitutional, as discussed in more detail below.
B.

Policy Rationales for Allowing the Sniffs

The Supreme Court has presented policy rationales to
support the viewpoint that the canine sniff is itself constitutional,
particularly because it does not qualify as a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment. In two of its foundational “dog sniff” cases,
the Court drew a distinction between a dog sniff and a search
under the Fourth Amendment, often relying on the misconception
that detection dogs are always accurate.50 This differentiation
means that a dog sniff does not need to comply with certain
requirements that would be otherwise necessary if the officer
were to conduct a search—namely, obtaining a warrant or
holding probable cause of criminal activity.51 In crafting this
distinction, the Court focuses on three main points: (1) that the
government has a strong interest in finding illegal substances,
(2) that individuals do not have a privacy interest in illegal
substances, and (3) that detection dogs are capable of identifying
only illegal substances.
The Court first began to develop this line of reasoning in
1983 when it decided United States v. Place. In this case, the
Court declared that a sniff is not a search.52 After determining
that a “strong governmental interest” exists in stopping the
movement of illegal substances, the Court balanced this
interest against any privacy violations that occurred through
the means of a dog sniff.53 The Court explained that a sniff is
“sui generis”54 because it does not require the same invasive
techniques as an ordinary search, nor can it detect the presence
of legal substances—only illegal substances that the dogs have
been trained to identify.55 Notably, the Court’s analysis rested
on what it referred to as a “well-trained narcotics detection
celebrating the veteran canines who worked in the police force). When speaking about
the K9 unit, Sergeant Kenneth Keenan stated: “[n]obody remembers my name, but
they always remember the dog’s name.” Id.
50 See infra Part IV (describing the high levels of inaccuracy in police dog alerts).
51 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 25–26 (1968) (stating that “the police must,
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through
the warrant procedure, . . . or that in most instances failure to comply with the warrant
requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances,” and further stating that a
“‘full’ search” cannot be completed in the absence of probable cause).
52 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). For an analysis on this
case, see infra Section II.B.2.
53 Place, 462 U.S. at 704–05.
54 “Sui generis” is defined as: “Of its own kind or class; unique or peculiar.”
Sui Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
55 Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
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dog,” presumably meaning one that could not or would not
alert to a legal substance by mistake.56 Over twenty years later
in Illinois v. Caballes, the Court reiterated this distinction,
adding that one cannot hold a valid or reasonable interest in
possessing illegal substances, and because a dog will alert only
after it detects an illegal substance, a dog sniff can establish
the probable cause necessary for a full search and does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.57 By relying on the fiction that
each drug dog is properly trained and reliable, the Court did
not address the possibility that unreliable dogs are often
working in the field.58
Notably, the Court’s reasoning in these cases relied on
the belief that detection dogs can detect only illegal substances.
However, as will be discussed in Part IV, these sniffs are often
inaccurate, leading to violations of privacy rights that outweigh
the government interest in having sniffs in the first place.59 The
Court’s misconception on this point has allowed the government
to continue to use detection dogs in ways that should not be
available when the dogs are not properly trained or reliable.
II.

THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN
DIFFERENT SETTINGS

The term “reasonable expectation of privacy” was first
coined in Katz v. United States.60 Justice Harlan, concurring with
the majority decision, explained that an individual holds a
reasonable expectation of privacy when two conditions are met:
“first that a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”61
However, over time, the “subjective” aspect of this test has
become less important.62
See id.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005).
58 Notably, in Caballes, the Respondent argued that these detection dogs are not
always accurate. Id. at 409. However, the Court brushed this argument aside, and worked
under the assumption that this is not the case. Id. For an analysis on how the court treats
reliability in detection dogs, see infra Part IV.
59 See infra Part IV.
60 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 361. This principle was reaffirmed by the Court the following year.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
62 See generally California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–41 (1988) (An
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy to garbage exposed to the public, even if
he does not subjectively believe that anyone will go through it.); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 588–92 (1974) (officers taking a paint chip from the exterior of a vehicle in a parking lot
was not a Fourth Amendment intrusion, even if the individual would not subjectively
believe that an officer would do such a thing).
56
57
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The Supreme Court has stated that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,”63 yet at the same time
seems to determine “reasonableness” based on the location of a
search.64 In doing so, the Court has created a sliding scale
analysis to determine the reasonableness of a search, and
likewise determine the reasonableness of a sniff based on where
the sniff occurred.65 This scale refers to the different levels of
reasonableness of one’s potential expectation of privacy, which is
determined by balancing the government interest of the search
against the resulting invasion of privacy of that person.66 A home
or dwelling carries the highest expectation of privacy and
therefore offers the most protection for citizens.67 Airports, on
the contrary, provide citizens with the lowest reasonable
expectation of privacy.68 Finally, somewhere in the middle is the
automobile—where a citizen’s expectation of privacy is reduced
but not eliminated.69 While the Court has articulated that the
pedestrian is entitled to some protections on the street,70 it has
not acknowledged any privacy rights for the individual against
the street sniff—and, therefore, it permits the street sniff to

63 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. This quote originated from the Katz decision, but has
since been reiterated in various Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 49 (2001); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
64 The Court appears to determine whether an individual’s expectation of privacy
is reasonable by evaluating the location where the search occurred—particularly
concentrating on the importance of the location and any potential government interests that
induced the search. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (stating that because of the home’s value
in society—as evaluated under the common-law—there are only a few exceptional
circumstances which would permit an officer’s warrantless entry into a home); see also
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (explaining that because the
government has a high ability to consistently regulate vehicles, one in a vehicle holds a
reduced expectation of privacy—thereby granting the government a greater right to search
a vehicle than it would a home); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)
(stating that the home is an important part of history, and therefore, certain intrusions are
not permissible); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (explaining that there
are different expectations of privacy for one in a vehicle and one in a home because it is less
practicable to obtain a warrant for a vehicle than it is for a home).
65 Angela S. Overgaard, Comment, People, Places, and Fourth Amendment
Protection: The Application of Ybarra v. Illinois to Searches of People Present During the
Execution of Search Warrants on Private Premises, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 243, 245–46 (1994)
(describing the Court’s test to determine the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy).
66 See What Does the Fourth Amendment Mean?, U.S. COURTS, http://www.us
courts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activityresources/what-does-0 [https://perma.cc/6FMA-ZJVC] (describing the Fourth Amendment
balancing test by stating: “[w]hether a particular type of search is considered reasonable in
the eyes of the law, is determined by balancing . . . the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights . . . [against] legitimate government interests, such as public safety”).
67 See infra Section II.A.
68 See infra Section II.B.
69 See infra Section II.C.
70 See infra Section II.D.
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continue, absent safeguards71 to protect the pedestrian’s right to
privacy.72 However, in examining the Court’s rationales, which
support heightened expectations of privacy in other locations, it is
clear that pedestrians are entitled to heightened rights as well,
particularly those that are equivalent to the reasonable
expectation of privacy afforded to those in a vehicle. The Court’s
rationales in each of the other categories for Fourth Amendment
protection demonstrate the appropriateness of a heightened
expectation of privacy for pedestrians.
A.

The Highest Expectation of Privacy: The “Home Cases”

The “home cases” present rationales supporting the
highest level of privacy when in one’s home—rationales that
are not found where an individual is situated elsewhere. The
Court has held, “[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment]
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable government intrusion.”73 To
protect the home against invasion, the Court has required that,
absent exigent circumstances, an officer have a warrant to
either enter or search the home.74 As per the explicit language
in the Fourth Amendment, a warrant can be obtained only
after the showing of probable cause of criminal activity.75 The
Court has upheld an individual’s high right to privacy in the
home even in the context of the dog sniff.

71 These safeguards refer to limitations that the Court has placed on officers
who are conducting sniffs in those locations that offer a moderate to high expectation of
privacy. See cases cited supra note 11.
72 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), for the Court’s determination that
pedestrians hold a reasonable expectation of privacy against unreasonable searches and
seizures while walking on a street.
73 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); see also Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 583–590 (1980) (describing the high expectation of privacy that
individuals hold in their homes).
74 Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at
the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably
be crossed without a warrant.”). The Court has described “exigent circumstances” as
“emergency or dangerous situation[s].” Id. at 583.
75 “[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Court has consistently upheld the
probable cause requirement. See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)
(discussing the importance of a warrant that is based on truthful probable cause);
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568–69 (1971) (upholding and re-emphasizing the rule
that a warrant is invalid if not based on accurate probable cause).
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1. Privacy in the Home
As technological advancements expanded in the United
States, so too did novel manners of searching homes. In Kyllo v.
United States,76 the Supreme Court inquired into the protection
of privacy in the home against thermal-imaging devices.77 An
agent of the United States Department of the Interior
suspected that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana but did not
hold enough evidence to obtain a warrant to search his home.78
For this reason, the officer sat across the street from Kyllo’s
house, and scanned the home with a thermal-imager based on
his knowledge that growing marijuana requires specific lamps
that radiate high levels of heat.79 Thermal-imagers sit outside
of the home and detect and record these heat levels, and
therefore can indicate whether it is likely that marijuana is
being grown inside.80 The Court began the Kyllo decision with a
short and sweet prelude of what was to come: “With few
exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home
is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.”81
Backed by established common law that one is entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the home, the Court
defended this right against ever-enhancing technology and held
that even though the agent did not physically enter the home,
his use of technology to obtain the same evidence that could
otherwise be gained through a physical invasion violated the
Fourth Amendment.82 Kyllo demonstrated the Court’s
understanding that the home is inherently valuable to society and
carries with it a high expectation of privacy.
2. Privacy in the Home When Canines Are Present
While the Court valued privacy in the home against
technology,83 it had yet to consider the canine sniff in
conjunction with the home. In Florida v. Jardines,84 upon
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
The thermal-imaging device utilized in Kyllo was the Agema Thermovision
210 thermal imager. Id. at 29. The Court explained that “[t]hermal imagers detect
infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked
eye. The imager converts radiation into images based on relative warmth—black is
cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences.” Id at 29–30.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 29.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 31.
82 Id. at 34.
83 Id.
84 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
76
77

1390

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:3

suspecting that Joelis Jardines was growing marijuana inside of
his home, a human detective and his K9 partner traveled onto
the premises and conducted a canine sniff on Jardines’s front
porch.85 Once the dog detected the scent of marijuana, it alerted
its handler—who then left, obtained a search warrant based on
this information, and searched the home pursuant to the
warrant.86 Though the Court’s decision rested on property
rationales—stating that because the sniff occurred within the
constitutionally protected area of Jardines’s home where the
officers did not have permission to be, this manner of
investigation
was
unconstitutional87—Justice
Kagan’s
concurrence argued instead that this case could have been viewed
through an evaluation of the privacy rights.88 Kagan compared a
drug-sniffing dog to Kyllo’s thermal-imager,89 specifying that
the established value of the home required a warrant for this
type of dog sniff.90 While not the majority decision, Kagan’s
evaluation of privacy rights demonstrated the heightened value
placed on the home and that which occurs within it.
Precedent cases that evaluate the standard of privacy in
the home stand for the proposition that a high expectation of
privacy based on common-law tradition and history will protect
against invasion, whether accomplished through human or
nonhuman means. In both contexts, the Court requires that an
officer have a warrant based on probable cause prior to entering
the home or conducting a search of the premises. In assessing
both privacy and property doctrines, the Court affords a high
expectation of privacy to the home, as well as the individuals
within it, and thus places the home on the far end of the sliding
scale of Fourth Amendment rights.

Id. at 1413.
Id.
87 Id. at 1415–17. The Court explained that the reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine was simply added to the traditional property ideals and did not replace
them altogether—and, therefore, this case could be evaluated under the principles of
property law. Id at 1417 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951–52 (2012)).
Further, the Court explained that there is an implicit license for one to walk to the front
door, knock, wait to be answered, and then leave—but that this license does not extend to
a dog entering onto the premises to sniff for drugs. Id. at 1415–16.
88 Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring). Justice Kagan explained that property
concepts and privacy concepts will likely follow the same pattern, as the law of property
will influence what society will understand to be a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
89 See id. at 1419 (arguing that the canine sniff and the thermal-imager are
similar because neither was used by the general public and both were used to explore
what were otherwise unknowable events occurring inside the home).
90 See id. at 1419–20.
85
86
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The Lowest Expectation of Privacy: The “Airport Cases”

At the opposite end of the spectrum from the “home
cases” are the “airport cases.” Though federal courts have
looked at far fewer cases involving privacy rights in airports,
the cases that they have looked at have demonstrated that,
distinct from both the home and vehicle cases, privacy rights of
those in an airport are at their lowest. The Court bases this low
expectation of privacy on two rationales: the inherent nature of
an airport and the safety interests held by the government.91
The government has a strong interest in stopping drug trafficking
and airports often serve an integral role in this activity.92 Unlike
in the vehicle, which implicates these safety interests to a lesser
extent,93 one holds a low expectation of privacy in the airport
setting because she will necessarily fall subject to full searches
and seizures, absent prior probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
as part of routine security screening.94 Indeed, while the Court
has held in the past that people in airports are entitled to privacy
rights,95 this is true only after the individual has consented to and
completed a full security check. Airport security procedures
indicate that one’s right to privacy in an airport—if existent—is
extremely minimal. In a sense, the individual trades her right to
privacy for access to the airport and plane.
1. Privacy in the Airport
The Supreme Court has indicated that, although a very
low bar, individuals continue to hold some privacy rights even
when in an airport. In Florida v. Royer, the Court found that
police officers violated an individual’s rights when their stop
91 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983) (stating that, “[b]ecause of
the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at airports, allowing police to make
brief investigative stops of persons at airports . . . substantially enhances the likelihood that
police will be able to prevent the flow of narcotics into distribution channels”).
92 Id. at 704–05.
93 The World Drug Report indicates that throughout the past several years,
planes were one of the “most common mode[s] of transportation used by drug
traffickers globally,” with high numbers of seizures. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME,
WORLD DRUG REPORT 39–40 (2015), https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr2015/
World_Drug_Report_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ82-A84B]. In comparison, eight
percent of drug traffickers chose to transport drugs via boats and the remaining
forty-six percent was split between traffickers transporting drugs by trains and by
vehicles. Id. at 39.
94 See TSA: Despite Objections, All Passengers Must Be Screened, CNN (Nov.
16, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/11/15/california.airport.security/ [https://
perma.cc/93FT-4WEV] (stating that officers applying safety procedures in airports require
that everyone be subjected to a search).
95 See Place, 462 U.S. at 706–07.
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became too intrusive.96 In this case, two detectives noticed the
defendant walking through an airport and displaying the
telltale signs of someone involved in drug trafficking.97 After
the defendant consented to having a conversation with the
officers, he became noticeably nervous and the officers told him
that they suspected that he was involved with drug trafficking
and that he should accompany them to another room.98 Once in
the room, the officers found marijuana in his suitcases, which
they opened with his consent.99 The Court held that the entire
procedure was constitutional until the moment that the officers
had the defendant accompany them into the back room. “The
predicate,” the Court explained, for “permitting seizures on
suspicion short of probable cause is that law enforcement
interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security
of the suspect.”100
Although the Supreme Court has furthered the
individual’s right to privacy in the context of the airport, it is
clear that an individual holds a low expectation of privacy here,
as compared to that held in other locations such as the home or
the vehicle. The robust link between the airplane and “drug
courier activity”101 creates a specific need for the government to
implement safety protections, which outweighs one’s interest in
privacy rights. Individuals’ privacy rights in an airport are, in a
sense, dependent on their consenting to the intrusive security
measures of the airport. The government’s interest in
maintaining public safety102 is visible in the wide array of safety
procedures that airport-goers are subject to.103 The notion that
upon entering an airport, everyone must comply with baggage
checks, screenings, pat downs, and possibly body searches has
become commonplace.104 Here, government agents are not
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504, 507 (1983).
Id. at 493.
98 Id. at 493–94.
99 Id. at 494–95.
100 Id. at 500–01.
101 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983).
102 The issue of drug trafficking is not the only safety concern that is protected
through airport security regulations—terrorist activity is also highly linked with
airport travel. See Corey Flintoff, Why Do Terrorists So Often Go for Planes?, NPR
(May 15, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/05/15/152750767/why-do-terrorists-so-often-gofor-plane [https://perma.cc/4DLF-TJNT]. An interview with terrorism analyst Jessica
Stern indicates that “[t]errorists like to do what they know how to do,” explaining why
they continue to blow up planes. Id.
103 The government uses various methods to ensure safety before people are
permitted to board a flight. Security Screening, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.
gov/travel/security-screening [https://perma.cc/8NMX-B8JR].
104 See id.; see also TSA: Despite Objections, All Passengers Must Be Screened,
supra note 94.
96

97
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merely observing individuals and their actions, but rather are
touching, screening, and scanning people’s bodies and luggage—
thereby eliminating any expectation that one may hold against a
search or seizure elsewhere. Moreover, the substantial reduction
in the privacy rights that one can expect to hold in an airport is
justified by the personal choice that one commits to in choosing
to enter an airport, thereby trading her right to object to a
search.105 The Court has explicitly commented on these
government interests in the context of the dog sniff in an airport.
2. Privacy in the Airport When Canines Are Present
In United States v. Place, the Court evaluated its
holding in Florida v. Royer in the context of the dog sniff, and
emphasized the government’s interest in searches in an
airport.106 The Court clarified that the government’s interest in
halting the spread of deadly drugs is particularly applicable in
the airport setting because airports have an “inherently
transient nature of drug courier activity.”107 Notably, and unlike
in Royer, this case involved a drug-detection dog, which
appeared to play a role in the Court’s decision-making process.
The Court explained that an individual person holds a privacy
interest in her luggage, and while she must comply with bag
check procedures, she is nonetheless protected from an officer
approaching her randomly and “expos[ing] noncontraband
items that otherwise would remain hidden from public
view . . . [by] rummaging through the contents of the luggage.”108
According to the Court, there is no danger of invasion by use of a
detection dog as these dogs can detect only illegal substances,
and therefore, any search resulting from a dog’s alert would be
based on the confirmed presence of contraband items.109 The
Court relied on its belief that dog sniffs are generally accurate to
support its holding that an individual’s limited expectation of
privacy would not be violated through a dog sniff in the way that
it would be if this individual were subject to procedures that
were not so targeted.
In considering the holdings of Place and Royer, it seems
likely that had the Court not believed that detection dogs are
105
106

561 (1980)).

See TSA: Despite Objections, All Passengers Must Be Screened, supra note 94.
Place, 462 U.S. at 703 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,

107 Id. at 704; see also U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 93, at xii,
39 (indicating that in 2015 drug traffickers transported drugs via planes, boats, trains,
and vehicles).
108 Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
109 Id.
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often accurate, it may have led to a different outcome. It might
have held that the dog sniff has the potential to be as invasive
as a search or pat down and, therefore, must be supported by
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.110 The Court’s reliance
on its notion of the completely accurate dog means that a search
could never result from a dog’s alert unless there is contraband
present. However, this fails to acknowledge the fact that a false
alert, which creates probable cause, leads to the unsupported
search that the Court has aimed to disallow. As will be
explained in Part IV, the Court’s misconception on this point
causes the individual to be prone to more invasive procedures
than should be permitted under the Fourth Amendment.
C.

The Moderate Expectation of Privacy: The “Vehicle Cases”

The “vehicle cases” rest at the center of the reasonable
expectation of privacy sliding scale. The Supreme Court has
found that, while in a vehicle, citizens can expect a moderate
level of privacy—somewhere between the expectation of those
in their homes and those in the airport.111 Unlike the “home
cases”—which rely on the inherent value of the home, as well
as the crucial role that it has played throughout common-law
tradition and history112—and unlike the “airport cases”—which
concentrate on the government interest in ending drugtrafficking—the “vehicle cases” focus upon three distinct
rationales: practicability, an ability to regulate, and safety
interests that relate to a vehicle on the road.113 With these
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–500 (1983).
See Fourth Amendment—Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Automobile
Searches, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498, 498 (1979) (explaining that the vehicle is
“one of the few exceptions to the rule that ‘warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable.’” (footnote omitted)).
112 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[I]n the case of the search
of the interior of homes . . . there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law,
of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable.”); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (stating “[a]t the very
core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion”). See supra Section II.A for
a complete analysis of the Court’s understanding of the value of the home.
113 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450–51 (1990)
(explaining that a general sobriety checkpoint absent prior reasonable suspicion would
not be unconstitutional because of the “magnitude of the drunken driving problem [and]
the States’ interest in eradicating it”); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–68
(1976) (stating that people in automobiles hold a lower expectation of privacy than those
in the home because “[a]utomobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and
continuing governmental regulation and controls”); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 153 (1924) (stating that unlike for a home, securing a warrant for a vehicle is not
practicable “because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought”).
110

111
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particular policy considerations in play, vehicles remain at the
center of the sliding scale for privacy rights.114
1. Privacy in Vehicles
Generally, the law affords the home greater privacy
protections than a vehicle because of the impracticability in
obtaining a warrant and conducting a search in a timely manner
in most vehicle cases.115 In Carroll v. United States,116 the
Supreme Court distinguished the two situations and created a
lower standard for searches of a vehicle than of a home. During
prohibition,117 at which time it was unlawful to possess, use, or
travel with liquor,118 agents who patrolled a public road became
suspicious that a group of passengers traveling in a particular
car were carrying liquor.119 The officers pulled over the vehicle,
conducted a search, and found alcohol located inside.120 The
Court explained that this stop and search was constitutional, as
the officers held a reasonable suspicion that there was criminal
activity occurring in the vehicle.121 This, now known as “the
Carroll doctrine,” established that an officer need only have
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity prior to stopping the
vehicle in order to ask the driver questions and establish the
probable cause needed to constitutionally search it.122 This
doctrine created a lesser requirement on an officer to stop and
search a vehicle than would be required for one to search a
home123 because, the Court explained, the warrant requirement
is not practicable in the context of a traffic stop. While an officer
may readily obtain a warrant for a dwelling, the officer seeking a
warrant for a vehicle risks the vehicle leaving the jurisdiction
on a whim.124 Nonetheless, the Court clarified that when a
114 See Fourth Amendment—Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Automobile
Searches, supra note 111 (describing the vehicle as offering fewer privacy protections
than the home).
115 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
116 Id. at 132.
117 Prohibition made illegal the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
118 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 143–44.
119 Id. at 160. The officers became suspicious because they had observed the group
of men traveling in the same vehicle multiple times throughout the patrol, each time they
passed, they were coming from the direction of an area that was known to supply alcohol,
and the individuals in the car were known to be the “bootleggers” of the area. Id.
120 Id. at 135–36, 162.
121 Id. at 162.
122 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 570 (1991).
123 Distinguishable from the vehicle, the Court has held that entering into or
using devices to explore the inside of a home “is a ‘search’ and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
124 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
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warrant could be readily secured for a vehicle with
“reasonabl[e] practicab[ility],” it must be.125 In this balance, the
Court did not eliminate one’s right to privacy in a vehicle, but
rather balanced this right against other issues facing the lawenforcing officer.
Practicability is not the sole consideration of the Court
in distinguishing between privacy rights maintained in the
home and those maintained in a vehicle. In South Dakota v.
Opperman, the Court considered the government’s ability to
regulate vehicles as a compelling rationale for a moderate
expectation of privacy.126 The Court held constitutional an officer’s
warrantless search of a vehicle after it had been towed and taken
to a city impound lot127 because of the government’s ability to
continually regulate vehicles.128 In particular, the Court mentioned
that the government regulates periodic inspections, license checks,
and examination of license plates, inspection stickers, exhaust
fumes, excessive noise, headlights, and the overall functioning of
a vehicle.129 The government’s ability to regulate vehicles gives
the individual a lower expectation that she has complete control
over or privacy in a vehicle.
Aside from a vehicle’s ability to leave the jurisdiction
and its subjection to continuous government regulations, the
Court has also concentrated on the increased public safety
risks inherent in illegal behavior that takes place in a
vehicle.130 For example, in Delaware v. Prouse,131 an officer
conducted a random traffic stop to check the driver’s license and
registration.132 Indeed, it was only after the officer had pulled
over the driver that he began to suspect that there were drugs
inside the car.133 The Court held that this particular type of stop
was overly intrusive, as the officer did not hold reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity occurring prior to his conducting
the stop.134 According to the Court, there were less-intrusive
types of stops that could promote safety without violating the
Id. at 156.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
127 Id. at 366. The Court also mentioned that the warrantless search was
constitutional because of the officer’s particular need to protect others and also protect
the property inside the vehicle. Id. at 369.
128 Id. at 367.
129 Id. at 368.
130 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451–52 (1990)
(explaining that there is a high risk of drunk-driving and the government therefore has
an interest in stopping vehicles to ensure that the drivers are not intoxicated).
131 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
132 Id. at 650.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 655–59.
125
126
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Fourth Amendment and, therefore, the government’s interest
in maintaining public safety on the road would not outweigh a
driver’s Fourth Amendment rights.135 Eleven years later, the
Court identified one such less-intrusive alternative in Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz, where it upheld a general
sobriety checkpoint that stopped all vehicles so that officers
could check drivers for signs of intoxication.136 The Prouse-Sitz
doctrine stands for the proposition that although the government
holds a strong interest in promoting public safety, this interest
must nonetheless be balanced against a driver’s heightened
reasonable expectation of privacy.
2. Privacy in Vehicles When Canines Are Present
The reasonable suspicion requirement for traffic stops137
soon implicated questions regarding what an officer could do
once he stops a vehicle. Illinois v. Caballes138 and Rodriguez v.
United States139 are the two leading cases that limit an officer’s
use of a canine during a traffic stop.140 In Caballes, a State
Trooper pulled over a man for speeding.141 During the stop, the
officer permitted his dog to circle and sniff the outside of the
vehicle, which led to an alert revealing marijuana stored in the
trunk.142 In evaluating the constitutionality of the sniff, the
Court clarified that a dog sniff is not a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes, and therefore does not require prior
reasonable suspicion.143 While the Court held the stop and sniff
in this case to be constitutional, it nonetheless placed specific
135 Id. at 655, 659. The Court maintained that those in a vehicle hold a strong
reasonable expectation of privacy against reasonless stops by stating that, “[a]n individual
operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy
simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation.” Id. at 662.
136 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 455 (1990). The Court
balanced the government’s interest in societal safety against the intrusion of privacy rights.
Id. at 455. The Court concentrated on media reports of drunk-driving accidents and annual
death statistics in finding that the state had an important interest in stopping drunk
driving. Id. at 451. On the other hand, the Court found there to be only a slight intrusion
into the rights of motorists who were stopped at these checkpoints because the law-abiding
citizen would be able to see that others had been stopped. Id. at 452–53 (citing United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976)). The Court also emphasized the
checkpoint’s likely effectiveness in achieving safety. Id. at 454 (distinguishing a general
sobriety checkpoint from the random Prouse stop by explaining the Prouse stops offered a
“complete absence of empirical data” demonstrating the potential effectiveness of the
program, and that general sobriety stops are effective).
137 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979).
138 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
139 Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
140 See id. at 1614; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.
141 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 408–10.
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emphasis on the requirement that the initial stop be
constitutional in itself. It explained that a driver’s expectation of
privacy in a vehicle will neither affect nor limit a sniff that
occurs once a vehicle has been pulled over as long as the stop
was constitutional at its commencement.144 The Court’s emphasis
on this point seemed to indicate that there are at least some
limitations on an officer’s ability to allow a canine sniff. These
restrictions were later specified in Rodriguez.
In Rodriguez, the Court clarified the limitations that it
had begun to articulate in Caballes, to restrict what would
otherwise be a limitless power for police. In this case, an officer
stopped a vehicle because it had been swerving on the road.145
After writing a ticket for the driver, the officer allowed his dog to
sniff the vehicle even though the officer had no reasonable
suspicion of any further illegal activity.146 Distinguishable from
Caballes, the Court here found that the traffic stop had been
completed once the officer finished writing the ticket.147
Therefore, the sniff became a separate event that required its
own reasonable suspicion for the officer to hold the vehicle
beyond the scope of the original stop and purely for the purpose
of allowing a canine to sniff it.148 Both the initial stop and the
extension of the traffic stop must be supported by their own
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.149
Although the vehicle cases do not limit a dog sniff in
itself, they nonetheless place restrictions on when and where a
dog sniff may take place. The sniff will be constitutional if the
reason that an officer stopped the vehicle is constitutional and
the sniff occurred concurrently with the investigation of the
action that gave rise to the reasonable suspicion for the officer
to pull over the car. Similarly, it can be assumed that if the car
was stopped on its own accord, a dog sniff of an already stopped
vehicle would be constitutional as well. It is instead the limitation
on the extension of the stop, for the purposes of conducting a
separate dog sniff, that is restricted if not supported by
reasonable suspicion.150 The Court’s reasoning in these cases
maintains the idea that although an individual in a vehicle is
Id.
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612–13.
146 See id. at 1613 (explaining that “[t]he District Court adopted the Magistrate
Judge’s factual findings and legal conclusions” that the officer did not hold a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was occurring when he extended the stop).
147 Id. at 1612.
148 See id. at 1614 (“Authority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the
traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”).
149 Id. at 1616.
150 See id. at 1614–15.
144
145
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afforded a lower reasonable expectation of privacy as compared to
an individual in her home, she nonetheless is deserving of
protection against limitless stops, and potentially, sniffs.
D.

The Unmeasured Expectation of Privacy: The
“Pedestrian Cases”

As demonstrated in precedent case law applicable to the
home, airport, and vehicle, a reasonable expectation of privacy
depends on a person’s location due to varying government
interests pertaining to each place.151 Indeed, it seems that the
Court’s “people, not places”152 doctrine is based, in fact, on
where the individual is at the time of the possible invasion—as
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy will change
depending on her location. Moreover, there are various times
when it is, in fact, the place that is being protected. For
example, the warrant requirement protects the home itself
from invasion. Similarly, it is the car itself that is protected
from random traffic stops and extensions of stops. However, the
individual herself can still be said to be afforded heightened
protections when in these locations, as she is protected by her
personal rights as well as the second layer of protections
granted to her home or car. Because a pedestrian is not
shielded by the enclosure of a vehicle or a home, and therefore
cannot hide behind double layer of protection, she is left
vulnerable to the minimal protections for pedestrians, which
overlook the problems that inaccurate dog sniffs implicate.
While the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly indicated where
the pedestrian’s reasonable expectation of privacy falls on the
sliding scale in relation to dog sniffs, it has acknowledged at
least some existing privacy rights for pedestrians against

151 The Court appears to determine whether an individual’s expectation of
privacy is reasonable by evaluating the location where the search occurred—particularly
concentrating on the importance of the location and any potential government interests
which induced the search. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 34 (2001)
(stating that because of the home’s value in society—as evaluated under the commonlaw—there are only a few exceptional circumstances that would permit an officer’s
warrantless entry into a home); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1976)
(explaining that because the government has a high ability to consistently regulate
vehicles, one in a vehicle holds a reduced expectation of privacy—thereby granting the
government a greater right to search a vehicle than a home); Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (stating that the home is an important part of history and,
therefore, certain intrusions are not permissible); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
153 (1925) (explaining that there are different expectations of privacy for one in a vehicle
and one in a home because it is less practicable to obtain a warrant for a vehicle than it is
for a home).
152 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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searches by human officers.153 The Court’s acknowledgment of
these rights has developed through its interpretation of the
protections traditionally recognized under the common law.154
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court both identified a
privacy right for pedestrians as well as placed further limitations
on street-patrolling officers.155 The conflict presented in this case
began when an officer, who was standing on the street, noted
Terry and another man acting suspiciously.156 Specifically, the
officer observed them walking up and down the sidewalk in front
of a shop, pausing to peer through the shop’s window each time
that they passed;157 this behavior occurred roughly a dozen
times.158 Based on the officer’s belief that Terry was carrying a
weapon and intended to rob the store, the officer approached
Terry, stopped him, and conducted a pat down over his
clothes.159 While acknowledging that a pedestrian holds at least
some expectation of privacy,160 the Court nonetheless found
that based on the particular circumstances of the instant case,
the officer’s actions did not violate these rights.161
The Court’s decision rested upon an evaluation similar
to the one it used in Prouse and Sitz, namely, a balancing
between the government’s interest in permitting this type of
search and seizure—including effective crime prevention,
detection of crimes, and assurance that Terry did not pose a
danger to the officer or others—against the level of intrusion of
privacy rights held by the individual.162 Moreover, the Court
explained that the officer’s stop and pat down of Terry was
constitutional because he held a reasonable suspicion—based
on more than a mere hunch—of danger and criminal activity

153 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (stating that pedestrian Terry
held privacy rights that protected him against unreasonable searches and seizures
while walking on a street in Cleveland).
154 See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”).
155 Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, 28–29.
156 Id. at 5–6.
157 Id. at 6.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 6–7. The officer later clarified that he conducted the pat down purely
due to his suspicion that Terry posed an imminent danger and further stated that he
did not, at any point, look or feel inside of Terry’s clothing. Id. at 7.
160 See id. at 8–9 (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s “inestimable right of
personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the
homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs”).
161 Id. at 30.
162 Id. at 21–23.
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prior to approaching Terry.163 Indeed, the Court clarified that
the officer must base his reasonable suspicion on specific
inferences that the officer is capable of drawing from prior
experience in the field.164 Notably, the Court implemented this
reasonable suspicion requirement—thereby limiting the officer’s
ability to pat down this individual—even when Terry was in
public and on public property. An officer needs some reason to
pat down the individual before the pat down is constitutional.
The safeguard requiring that an officer hold a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity prior to stopping or patting down
an individual165 supports the argument that the pedestrian holds
a privacy right that fits somewhere on the sliding scale.
Based on the Terry case, as well as case law precedent
and considerations of government interests, the pedestrian
should be granted the same expectation of privacy as that which
she holds when in a vehicle—thereby also entitling the
pedestrian to similar safeguards against invasion by a dog sniff.
III.

WHY PEDESTRIANS ARE ENTITLED TO A HEIGHTENED
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

The current law does not require that a police officer
have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity prior to
permitting a street sniff. However, when sniffs are utilized in
the context of vehicles and homes, they are limited in their
application, as they are only possible subsequent to other
requirements having been met—namely, reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, or a warrant.166 These requirements protect
either the home or the vehicle itself, and thereby shield the
citizens inside from any danger that may result from less-thanreliable canine alerts.167 On the contrary, in the context of the
airport, individuals are required to consent to various types of
searches, and potentially dog sniffs.168 A declaration as to
163 Id. at 27–29. The Court clarified that this search would not have been
constitutional had the officer not limited his search to checking for weapons for his own
protection, or had the officer not held reasonable suspicion that he was dealing with a
“dangerous individual.” Id. at 27.
164 Id.
165 See id.
166 See cases cited supra note 11. Although not addressed in this note, there are
specific instances where officers may search a home, even without a warrant—
specifically, when there are “exigent circumstances.” See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S.
452, 460 (2011).
167 See infra Part IV (describing the high levels of inaccuracy in police dog alerts).
168 See Andrea Sachs, Don’t Mind the Wet Nose: TSA Enlists More Dogs to
Screen Passengers, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/
travel/dont-mind-the-wet-nose-tsa-enlists-more-dogs-to-screen-passengers-for-explosives/
2016/01/20/26e11d98-b983-11e5-829c-26ffb874a18d_story.html?utm_term=.fba343d9
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where the pedestrian’s expectation of privacy stands is
imperative to maintain specifications as to what police are and
are not permitted to do on the street. By applying the balancing
test that the Court consistently uses to determine one’s
expectation of privacy,169 it is apparent that pedestrians are
entitled to the same expectation of privacy as one in a vehicle.
A.

Policy Considerations and Government Interests Support
a Moderate Expectation of Privacy for the Pedestrian

Similarities between a pedestrian and vehicle, as well as
differences between a pedestrian and an individual in her home
or an airport, indicate that the pedestrian should hold a
moderate expectation of privacy equivalent to that held by an
individual in a vehicle. The three main rationales that the
Court has used to support a moderate expectation of privacy in
vehicles are: impracticability in obtaining a warrant, ability to
regulate a vehicle, and public safety,170 all which support a
moderate expectation of privacy for the pedestrian as well.
Although the policy rationales supporting the highest
reasonable expectation of privacy in the home do, in fact, lend
some support for a high reasonable expectation of privacy for
the pedestrian, the unique aspects of being a pedestrian create
a distinction between these two contexts. The Court depends on
two rationales for a high privacy right in the home: commonlaw tradition and history.171 In examining the way in which the
common-law and history value the pedestrian, the Court has
offered a rather literal reading of the text of the Fourth
Amendment.172 It has stated that “[n]o right is held more
c5eb [https://perma.cc/4CD9-TZVS] (discussing the use of detection dogs in airports); see also
Security Screening, supra note 103; TSA: Despite Objections, All Passengers Must Be
Screened, supra note 94.
169 See What Does the Fourth Amendment Mean?, supra note 66 (describing
the Court’s balancing test, by stating: “Whether a particular type of search is
considered reasonable in the eyes of the law, is determined by balancing . . . the
intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights . . . [against] legitimate
government interests, such as public safety”).
170 See supra Section II.C for a complete discussion on policy rationales behind
a moderate expectation of privacy for individuals in vehicles.
171 See supra Section II.A.
172 In examining the protections that the Fourth Amendment provides to the
citizen, the Court has looked at the language of the Fourth Amendment and how it can
practicably be interpreted, stating:
[I]t is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that
a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or
her body . . . is not a “search.” Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that
such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands
helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a “petty indignity.” It
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sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”173 This
serves to demonstrate that there is an inherent connection
between the Fourth Amendment and the individual—the
person—and her personal privacy.
At the same time, however, there are inherent
differences between a home and a pedestrian. For example, an
officer who intends to obtain a warrant to search a home will
not face the same difficulties as he may in obtaining a warrant
for the search of a pedestrian. As supported by the Carroll
doctrine, some locations extend a lower expectation of privacy
to the individual because of her ability to move out of the
jurisdiction before the officer has returned to execute a
warrant.174 Likewise, an officer’s reasonable suspicion that there
is criminal activity will not be enough to grant him access into the
home in the same way that it will permit the officer to conduct a
pat down of a pedestrian.175 Moreover, as indicated in Opperman,
when a location is subject to various government regulations, it
will generally offer a lower expectation of privacy for the
individual.176 While the individual is subject to regulations about
what she can or cannot do on the street, there are few regulations
supporting what one can do once in her home.177 For these
reasons, it is clear that the rationales supporting the highest
expectation of privacy in the home do not appropriately support
such a strong expectation for the pedestrian.
On the opposite end of the scale, the rationales
supporting a lower expectation of privacy at an airport do not
align with the pedestrian’s expectation on the street. At the
airport, an officer may conduct a search without a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. In fact, one can gain access to a
plane or airport only if she consents to relinquish all privacy

is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great
indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968) (footnote omitted).
173 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
174 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
175 Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“With few exceptions,
the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional
must be answered no.”), with Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (holding that an officer needs only
reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat down of a pedestrian).
176 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–69 (1976) (distinguishing
vehicles from homes because vehicles are under constant regulation by the government).
177 See supra Section II.A.
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rights and comply with both a bag and body search.178 Although
the Court appears to believe that an individual’s privacy rights
are in a sense reacquired after the search, it is only after giving
consent to an invasive search that this is allowed.179 This is
distinct from the pedestrian, who has not consented to comply
with a pat down or bag screening just because she is walking
on the street.
Unlike in the context of the home or the airport, the
pedestrian fits appropriately in the center of the sliding scale
along with the vehicle. First, an officer’s ability to obtain a
warrant so that he can conduct a search of a pedestrian is
greatly inhibited by the fact that an individual can move with
ease in and out of the jurisdiction. Indeed, in both the context
of a vehicle and a pedestrian, an officer is subject to potential
difficulty in maintaining knowledge about the whereabouts of
his suspect.180 Moreover, a pedestrian has the ease of getting into
a vehicle and driving away. While it is true that a vehicle has a
greater ability to travel farther distances than a pedestrian,
individuals are nonetheless harder to trace than vehicles,
causing the two to be very similar in this regard. For example,
vehicles are traceable via license plate and also cannot hide from
police in the same way that a single individual could. The ease of
fleeing from a location, in both the context of the vehicle and an
individual, produces problems for the officer attempting to
relocate either after taking the time to obtain a warrant.
Therefore, obtaining a warrant for either a vehicle or pedestrian
is less practical than obtaining a warrant to enter and search a
stationary dwelling, such as a home.181
Second, the government’s ability to regulate both vehicles
and individuals warrants granting both the same expectation of
privacy. As mentioned above, the government regulates motor
vehicle aspects such as periodic inspections, valid licenses,
proper license plates, inspection stickers, exhaust fumes,
excessive noise, headlights, and overall functioning of the
vehicle.182 These regulations—which contribute to a reduction of
public danger and nuisance183—exist in distinct, yet similar
178 The government utilizes various methods to ensure safety before people
are permitted to board a flight. See Security Screening, supra note 103; See also TSA:
Despite Objections, All Passengers Must Be Screened, supra note 94.
179 See supra Section II.B for a complete discussion on airport security and
individuals’ privacy rights in an airport.
180 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
181 See id.
182 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
183 See id. at 368–69 (explaining that maintaining regular checks on vehicles
will avoid “impeding traffic or threat[s to] public safety and convenience”).
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applications for the pedestrian. For example, the government
manages what an individual can or cannot do on public
property such as prohibitions against jaywalking184 and public
nudity.185 Moreover, nearly every state has implemented
disorderly conduct laws, which regulate acts such as public
drunkenness, loitering, and general disruption of the peace.186
Pedestrians—being highly regulated by the government—
therefore fit the Opperman doctrine that when so regulated,
hold a lower expectation than they would in their homes.187
Third, the issue of public safety is a crucial aspect for
privacy rights in the context of vehicles and pedestrians. A
heavy analysis is unnecessary here, as the Court has already
acknowledged that there are similar needs for public safety,
both on the public roadway and on the street. Finding the
government’s interest in supervising public safety to be
important, yet in need of limitations,188 the Court applied
parallel reasoning in both Prouse, in the context of a vehicle
stop, and Terry, in the context of a pedestrian stop and pat
down.189 As the Court stated in both instances, one’s privacy
interests in these situations are held too close to the Fourth
Amendment to allow a government interest in public safety to
invade it without limitations.190 Both cases guarantee the
individual—whether in a car or on the street—a safeguard that
upholds her right to privacy, by requiring that an officer have
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity prior to conducting a
stop or search.191
184 In attempting to combat the high number of pedestrian fatalities, state
legislatures have placed specific regulations on what pedestrians can and cannot do
when entering a crosswalk or street. See Pedestrian Crossing: 50 State Summary,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/transportation/pedestrian-crossing-50-state-summary.aspx [https://perma.cc/4
UC4-ZME6] for a list of these laws in each state. For example, a pedestrian may not
“suddenly leave the curb and enter a crosswalk into the path of a moving commercial
vehicle that is so close to constitute an immediate hazard” (Alaska), and “[p]edestrians
must yield the right-of-way to vehicles when crossing outside of a marked crosswalk or
an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection” (Arkansas). Id.
185 Every state code contains laws regulating public exposure, or what is
sometimes called “public lewdness.” For a complete list of these laws in each state, see
Nudity and Public Decency Laws in America, HG.ORG., https://www.hg.org/article.asp?
id=31193 [https://perma.cc/GD3E-YGJL].
186 Conduct: Disorderly Conduct, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(“Behavior that tends to disturb the public peace, offend public morals, or undermine
public safety.”); Disorderly Conduct, FINDLAW, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminalcharges/disorderly-conduct.html [https://perma.cc/5T9K-KQ32] (offering a brief description
of disorderly conduct laws that have been implemented in most states).
187 See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368.
188 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979).
189 See id.; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 30 (1968).
190 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662–63; Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, 30.
191 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662–63; Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, 30.
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The government interests providing for a moderate right
to privacy for one in a vehicle align perfectly with those interests
applicable to a pedestrian on the street. At the same time,
distinct government interests inducing either a higher or lower
expectation of privacy for those citizens in the home or airport do
not apply to the pedestrian in the same way. Therefore, unless the
pedestrian’s privacy interests are in contrast with those privacy
rights held by an individual in a vehicle, the expectations of
privacy in both contexts should be equal, in all aspects.
B.

The Individual’s Interests Support a Moderate
Expectation of Privacy for the Pedestrian

The individual’s interest in privacy rights on the street
are equivalent to her interest in privacy rights when in a
vehicle. The Court has consistently applied a balancing test to
all of its Fourth Amendment cases, evaluating the interests on
both sides—namely, the interests of the government, as well as
the interests of the individual.192 As discussed in Section III.A,
the government’s interest in the context of the vehicle and the
pedestrian are equivalent. Therefore, to determine where the
pedestrian falls on the sliding scale, the next step is to look on
the other side of the balancing test—at the individual’s privacy
interests when on the street and when in a vehicle.
The pedestrian’s interests in privacy rights are not
equivalent to those in the contexts of the home or the airport.
The home offers a barrier from the world and often has alarm
systems, blinds, or the like to assure that this barrier remains
intact. To be sure, the individual is more exposed when not
enclosed in the home and, therefore, could not possibly expect the
same level of privacy rights. Indeed, at the other end of the scale,
pedestrians have an interest in much higher privacy protections
than those individuals in an airport. The pedestrian has not
voluntarily consented to an intrusive search, nor is he required to
do so in order to gain access to the street or sidewalk.193
On the other hand, the interests that those in a vehicle
hold are identical to the interests of a pedestrian. The vehicle—
playing a crucial role in society, along with its unique ability to
move quickly in and out of jurisdictions—allows and induces
192 “Whether a particular type of search is considered reasonable in the eyes of
the law is determined by balancing . . . the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights . . . [against] legitimate government interests, such as public
safety.” What Does the Fourth Amendment Mean?, supra note 66.
193 See supra Section II.B for a complete discussion on airport security and
individuals’ privacy rights in an airport.
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people to expect that they are entitled to privacy in this area.194
As described by the Court, a vehicle is a location where
individuals tend to feel a “sense of security and privacy.”195 This,
the Court held, was enough to warrant privacy protections as
eliminating these protections would undercut the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment.196 Similarly, Terry offered the notion that a
person always has an expectation against unwarranted searches
and seizures of his person—even when not shielded by either a
vehicle or home.197 Moreover, it is a logical assumption that one
on the street holds an expectation of privacy to her person, as
people find a sense of security in areas such as their pockets,
purses, or wallets and likely will not expect to have someone
look inside.198 Generally, individuals keep their valuables on
their person because there is a sense of security in having an
item closeby—it gives the individual a stronger sense of control
over whatever the item may be. When someone holds something
on her person, the item is with her wherever she goes.
Conversely, if an individual leaves an item in a vehicle, she
cannot possibly exert the same control over it. The individual
experiences an expectation that the items in her pockets are
safe from inspection from the world unless she intentionally
makes the item viewable.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court has
stated, and restated, that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”199 Yet, people appear to be protected only
when they are in a particular location. If the Court and the
government are not willing to offer privacy rights for an
individual when she is not enclosed in a particular area, then
the entire Fourth Amendment doctrine is relying on a false
ideal. Clearly, the Court has intended to protect the individual,
and therefore, the individual should be protected—regardless
of whether she is enclosed in a structure.
The robust similarities in the government interests and
the individual interests between the pedestrian and one in a
vehicle create identical balancing factors—and therefore should
See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662–63.
Id.
196 Id.
197 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“[W]herever an individual may harbor a
reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(internal citations omitted))).
198 See What Does Your Purse Say About You, ABC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2006), http://
abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=1539488 [https://perma.cc/TW45-BNK5] (evaluating the
personal connection that one feels with the items kept in a purse or bag).
199 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
194
195
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produce the same result. Thus, the pedestrian should be
entitled to an expectation of privacy that falls in the middle of
the sliding scale—namely, a moderate expectation of privacy.
IV.

THE PROBLEM: WHY SNIFFS ARE PARTICULARLY
DANGEROUS TO ONE’S PRIVACY RIGHTS

The question that follows is: Why are these sniffs so
dangerous? If all they can do is determine whether or not
someone is carrying contraband, why are they so harmful to an
individual’s rights? The Court has held that police dog sniffs
are “sui generis,” as they are capable of identifying only
contraband.200 However, the Court’s blind faith in the canine
sniff201 disregards both reports of handler cues, which induce
dogs to alert falsely to the presence of drugs,202 and the
prevalence of poor training mechanisms leading to false alerts.
Because of these false alerts, searches may no longer be truly
limited to contraband.
It is not the fact that the dog has such different
capabilities from the human itself203 but rather the way in
which the law permits the police force to use the dog’s
capabilities that threatens individuals’ privacy rights. While a
human officer may have reason to search someone who carries
the scent of an illegal substance, the threshold for a dog’s smell
is much lower, thereby allowing it to recognize a new world of
smells that a human alone could not have detected.204 Moreover,
while a human officer must study the actions or behavior of the
suspect—perhaps by asking questions—prior to touching or

200 See supra note 54 for the definition of “sui generis.” The Court has held
that the dog sniff is “sui generis” because it believes that a sniff is limited to exposing
only contraband, and nothing else. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
201 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of
the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 15, 28 (1990) (“The myth [of the dog sniff] so
completely has dominated the judicial psyche in those cases that the courts either
assume the reliability of the sniff or address the question curiously; the dog is the clear
and consistent winner.”).
202 Bird, supra note 45, at 424. “Handler cues are [described as] conscious or
unconscious signals given from the handler that can lead a detection dog to where the
handler thinks drugs are located.” Id. A human officer’s approaching or suspecting
someone of carrying drugs may “cue” to the dog that it should alert to drugs to please
its handler—regardless of whether it has actually detected an illegal substance. Id.; see
also Lee, supra note 38 (describing some of the problems with handler communication).
203 See supra Section I.A for a discussion about what makes dogs so useful in
the K9 force.
204 Correa, supra note 31 (describing the anatomy of a dog’s nose and why it is
capable of detecting and identifying odors); see also Doyle, supra note 32 (describing
the abilities of one particular dog, named the “most successful drugs dog ever”).
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intruding the personal space of the pedestrian,205 dogs do not
communicate with a potential suspect in the same way. This,
coupled with the fact that no laws stop the human officer from
allowing the dog—that lacks its own discretion to choose who or
what to smell—to sniff random passersby without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, opens the door to invasions that,
without the dog, would be clearly unconstitutional.206
The prevalence of handler cues, coupled with poor training
methods, has led to low accuracy rates for dog alerts to illegal
substances. For example, a three-year study conducted by the
Chicago Tribune indicated that only 44% of alerts by detection
dogs in Illinois led to officers finding the illegal substances that
the dogs were trained to find.207 Notably, when looking at only the
dog sniffs of Hispanic individuals, the successful alert rate was
much lower—at only 27%.208 The study further looked into specific
counties in Illinois, showing that the highest percentage of
accurate alerts in any individual county was in Naperville, at 47%
accuracy, but at only 8% accuracy when involving Hispanic
individuals being sniffed.209 Indeed, studies examining the
accuracy of dogs that are trained to identify substances other
than drugs have demonstrated that dogs range greatly in
accuracy. For example, dogs trained to identify the smell of a
particular breed of tortoise varied in reliability from 27%–73%.210
Notably, and although various other sources have reported
statistics of low accuracy, one source in particular has
acknowledged an inherent difficulty in gathering precise statistics
of false alerts—due to the fact that this information may be used
against handlers by revealing the high prevalence of handler
cues, and also because there are no standardized requirements
that these handlers publicize their results.211
Handlers often give off “handler cues” to the canines,
triggering them to alert that they have sniffed contraband—
even when they have not.212 “Handler cues” are described as:
“conscious or unconscious signals given from the handler that
can lead a detection dog to where the handler thinks drugs are

205 See Terry v. United States, 392 U.S. 1, 27–29 (1968), for a demonstration
of an officer’s attempt to gather more information prior to conducting a street search.
206 Horowitz, supra note 37.
207 Hinkel & Mahr, supra note 33.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Lee, supra note 38.
211 Id.; see, e.g., Hinkel & Mahr, supra note 33. For a discussion about the lack
of standardized training across states, see also infra Section V.C.
212 See Bird, supra note 45, at 424.
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located.”213 A 2010 study led by Lisa Lit, a researcher at the
University of California, Davis, demonstrated that alerts by
drug-sniffing dogs are, in fact, affected by handler beliefs.214
Handler cues are dangerous because they induce the dog to
alert that it has identified a target substance in order to please
its human partner—regardless of whether the dog has actually
identified the scent at all.215 This sidesteps the requirement
that officers have reasonable suspicion or probable cause of
criminal activity, which serves as a method to make sure that
stops, pat downs, and possible searches are based on more than
just an officer’s hunch about or personal bias against a
pedestrian.216 Indeed, internal bias by handlers may be the
reason that the Chicago Tribune’s study yielded such low
accuracy rates for alerts of Hispanic drivers as compared to
other drivers across the board.217 Notably, however, although a
false alert during a traffic stop may be due to handler cues,218
safeguards that protect the individual inside the vehicle are
nonetheless present, as an officer is required to have reasonable
suspicion or probable cause before he can pull over a vehicle.
Handler cues continue to occur due to poor techniques
used in training both the handlers and the dogs. Trainers
themselves have commented on the fact that often dogs are not
properly trained and, in most states, no statutory standards of
performance exist.219 For the most part, this means that there
is no body of government ensuring that the handler-dog duos
are performing at a high level of accuracy, indicating that they
are qualified to continue working with the force. Training,
Id.
See generally Lisa Lit et al., Handler Beliefs Affect Scent Detection Dog
Outcomes, 14 ANIMAL COGNITION 387 (2011). In this study, Lit set up four different
rooms, each with different tests, though none of the rooms contained a target scent for the
dogs to identify. Id. at 389–90. Each team was told that there may be up to three target
scents in each room. Id. Some rooms had indicators—red construction paper that would
indicate to the human handler that there might be a target scent present. Some rooms
also had decoy scents. Id. The first room contained no indicators or decoys, the second
room contained an indicator but no decoys, the third room contained a decoy scent with
no indicators, and the fourth room contained both a decoy scent and an indicator. Id.
The rooms were double-blind, in the sense that neither the handler nor the dog were
previously aware of whether there was an illegal substance in the room. Id. However,
the handlers would likely believe that a substance was present in the rooms with the
construction paper markings. Id. at 392. Though the dogs should not have alerted to a
scent in any of the rooms, there were alerts in all of the rooms, with the most alerts
occurring in the rooms with the red construction paper. Id. at 389–90, 392.
215 Bird, supra note 45, at 424.
216 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
217 Hinkel & Mahr, supra note 33.
218 For example, a dog may be cued to alert by its handler when the handler
walks too slowly or too many times around a vehicle. Id.
219 Id.
213
214
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however, is absolutely crucial for both the dog and the
handler.220 Without implementing more stringent requirements
on training techniques both before and after the handlers and
dogs are allowed to enter the force, there is no way to reinforce
techniques that have the ability to curb the prevalence of
handler cues.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court appears to blindly
rely on training techniques without thoroughly evaluating
whether they work or not. The Court has stated that “evidence
of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training
program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert,”221
and further that “law enforcement units have their own strong
incentive to use effective training and certification programs,
because only accurate drug-detection dogs enable officers to
locate contraband without incurring unnecessary risks or
wasting limited time and resources.”222 Indeed, the entire drug
sniff doctrine is based on the Court’s belief that the detection
dogs are well trained and reliable.223 Yet, even when presented
with evidence that this assumption is incorrect—and that quite
often, the human officer’s cues trigger the dog’s alert—neither
the Court nor the government has taken the steps necessary to
protect the privacy rights that pedestrians deserve.224 Moreover,
while some lower courts have acknowledged that canine sniffs
can be unreliable and have held that they will not rely on a dog’s
sniff if that dog is often inaccurate, other courts have disregarded
these facts altogether, opting instead to rely on the alerts of
inaccurate dogs.225 The Seventh Circuit, for example, stated on
the one hand that, “[t]his should not become a race to the
bottom . . . . We hope and trust that the criminal justice
establishment will work to improve the quality of training and
the reliability of the animals they use, and we caution that a
failure to do so can lead to suppression of evidence.”226
However, the Court nonetheless found that a mere 59.5%
accuracy rate by a dog was “good enough.”227 Other lower courts
220 Alex Rothacker, a detection dog trainer, explained: “If you don’t train, you
can’t be confident in your dog . . . . A lot of dogs don’t train. A lot of dogs aren’t good.”
Id. He further explained that most trainers are simply “very lazy” when it comes to
training their dogs—but “[t]he dogs [can be] only as good as the handlers” are. Id.
221 Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013).
222 Id.
223 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
224 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411–12 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (listing and citing cases that presented showings of evidence of the “less than
perfect accuracy” of drug-sniffing dogs).
225 See, e.g., United States v. Bentley, 795 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015).
226 Id.
227 Id.
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have stressed the importance of training and accuracy for the
dogs.228 The Court’s misguided view of the reliability of canine
officers attributes to resulting privacy invasions for the victims
of inaccurate alerts.
Handler cues threaten the guarantees of privacy
provided by the Fourth Amendment because they create an easy
route to manipulate established law and circumvent rights that
pedestrians deserve. A human officer is required to provide
“specific and articulable” reasons229 for believing criminal activity
to be occurring before he can stop an individual and attempt to
alleviate his suspicions.230 However, rather than providing these
reasons, an officer might simply cue his dog to alert to a scent,
which would in turn permit an officer’s search—all while
technically not violating any current privacy laws for the
individual. Any officer accompanied by a dog has the ability—
intentionally or unintentionally231—to gain the probable cause
required to conduct a full search, thereby creating a system
where the pedestrian is subject to searches at the whim of the
officer—a notion explicitly held to be unconstitutional under
Terry.232 Absent government acknowledgment of pedestrians’
reasonable expectation of privacy and implementation of
heightened training and accuracy requirements for dogs and
handlers, government encroachment into pedestrians’ expectation
of privacy will have the freedom to continue to grow.
V.

A FOUR-PART TEST TO REGULATE THE STREET SNIFF AND
PROTECT PEDESTRIANS

To support the rights guaranteed to individuals under
the Fourth Amendment,233 the government must assure that
those who are entitled to equal expectations of privacy are
afforded equal protections and safeguards under the law.
Specifically, the government should maintain privacy protections
228 See, e.g., United States v. $80,760.00 in U.S. Currency, 781 F. Supp. 462, 478
(N.D. Tex. 1991) (stating that “[r]eliability problems [with detection dogs] arise when the
dog receives poor training, has an inconsistent record, searches for narcotics in conditions
without reliability controls, or receives cues from its handler”).
229 Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 6.
230 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27–29 (1968).
231 See Bird, supra note 45, at 424 (describing “handler cues” as “conscious or
unconscious signals given from the handler that can lead a detection dog to where the
handler thinks drugs are located”).
232 The Court in Terry stated, “in determining whether [an] officer acted
reasonably in . . . [conducting a search,] due weight must be given, not to his . . . ‘hunch,’
but to . . . specific reasonable inferences.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
233 The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to “protect[ ]
people from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.” What Does the Fourth Amendment
Mean?, supra note 66.
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for the pedestrian that are equivalent to those afforded to the
individual when in a vehicle. While the most effective way for the
government to assure the protection of pedestrians’ privacy
rights may be to eliminate the use of the canine sniff altogether,
this is not the best way to handle such a powerful and important
procedure. Not only is it unrealistic for the government to
abolish these constitutional sniffs because of their promise and
functionality but it is also true that not all sniffs lead to
inaccurate results.234 For these reasons, a better solution to the
problem at hand is to improve the accuracy of, rather than
eliminate, canine sniffs. In order to accomplish this, the
government should (1) acknowledge that a pedestrian’s
reasonable expectation of privacy is equivalent to that of a
passenger in a vehicle; (2) execute a temporary presumption
against the constitutionality of street sniffs not backed by human
reasonable suspicion; (3) implement standardized training for
canines and handlers, which targets the use of handler cues; and
(4) create and apply a threshold accuracy requirement for
handler-canine pairs.
A.

Government Acknowledgment of a Pedestrian’s
Heightened Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Government acknowledgement of the equivalent
expectation of privacy held by both individuals in vehicles and
on the street is crucial because—in its absence—the government
has the ability to work around the requisite “reasonable
suspicion” standard. This is particularly visible under the
current street sniff system. The most problematic part of the
street sniff is that dog sniffs, as they exist now, do not fit the
mold that the Court has assumed they do—in other words, they
are not truly limited to the “disclos[ure] [of] only the presence
or absence of narcotics,”235 as they often lead to more intrusive

234 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–10 (2005); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); United States v. Bentley, 795 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir.
2015). For a discussion about the way that the courts handle the idea that detection
dogs may not be completely reliable, see supra Part IV. As indicated by the Chicago
Tribune’s studies, at least some sniffs are accurate. Hinkel & Mahr, supra note 33 (In
discussing the low accuracy of dog alerts, Hinkel and Mahr specifically reference the
results of the Chicago Tribune’s three-year study on detection dogs. This study yielded
results indicating that only 44% of alerts by detection dogs in Illinois led to officers’
finding illegal substances or paraphernalia.).
235 Place, 462 U.S. at 707. For a discussion about the policy rationales that the
Court has relied on in determining that the dog sniff is constitutional, see supra
Section I.B.
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searches, premised on faulty evidence to begin with.236 Since dogs
are not reliable, there must be other safeguards to protect the
individual. In other locations (i.e., the home), other protections
mitigate the harm of the sniffs,237 but the individual on the street
is fully exposed to harmful sniffs that, based on the Court’s own
reasoning, are not constitutional.
It is not that the government must raise the
pedestrian’s expectation of privacy standard, but rather, that it
must acknowledge where it falls on the sliding scale.
Individuals after Terry were promised the right against being
stopped or patted down absent a human officer’s reasonable
suspicion. This is the equivalent protection offered to those in a
vehicle; after Prouse and Sitz, an officer must have a
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop unless everyone is
being stopped. With that in mind, it is important to ensure that
these standards are being maintained across the board, as
individuals are already entitled to an expectation of privacy
when on the street because the Terry decision has promised
them that their rights will not be violated without certain
evidence. However, these rights are not being maintained across
the board when it comes to dog sniffs. Dog sniffs in the vehicle
context are regulated in some way—there are requirements
about what an officer can or cannot allow his dog to do in
relation to a vehicle. The Court outlined these guidelines by
reaching different holdings in Caballes and Rodriguez. Moreover,
a moving vehicle cannot be sniffed unless the officer requires it to
stop.238 Distinct from a vehicle, a pedestrian is always exposed to
an officer who is approaching with a dog. Whether the
individual stops on her own accord or continues to walk, the
police officer can direct his dog to follow and sniff, even if the
officer does not require the individual to stop. For this reason,
the government must implement boundaries for these officers,
so that the exposed pedestrian’s rights are maintained.

236 See supra Part IV for a discussion about the way that the courts handle
the notion that detection dogs may not be completely reliable.
237 See supra Part II for a complete discussion about the safeguards that the
Court has put in place to protect individuals’ privacy rights in other contexts.
238 Notably, the exception to this statement is where an officer approaches an
already-parked vehicle. However, there is still a distinction between a parked vehicle and
Jane Doe, who is standing in place on the street on her own accord. See supra
Introduction. Although neither instance requires that the officer physically stop his
suspect to conduct a sniff, a parked car invokes less of a sense of security and privacy
than does a pedestrian’s own body and person. An individual who leaves her vehicle
behind is generally less likely to feel a sense of privacy there, as opposed to her pockets or
purse. See supra Section III.B for a discussion about a pedestrian’s expectation of privacy
over items kept on her person, as opposed to those items that she leaves in a vehicle.
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Acknowledging the heightened expectation of privacy
and implementing guidelines and regulations to protect it is
both possible and realistic. If the government were to
acknowledge a pedestrian’s right to a higher expectation of
privacy, it would essentially require that the government
implement a standardized rule for police handlers who conduct
these sniffs, which would set the stage for heightened accuracy
requirements. A governmental acknowledgement that pedestrians
are entitled to a higher expectation of privacy will serve to mold
future laws and requirements, as well as to ensure that future
decisions by the Court—even if based on blind reliance on the
accuracy of a dog—feature dog sniffs that are actually reliable.
If, on the other hand, the government does not improve
training, it would at the very least need to acknowledge that
pedestrians are entitled to a heightened expectation of privacy,
because the level of privacy currently afforded to pedestrians
violates the Fourth Amendment.
It is important to note that inaccurate alerts that lead to
a finding of no illegal substances are generally not brought to
court. However, with a standard that implements actual privacy
rights for the pedestrian against these types of invasions,
pedestrians will have less of a burden in proving that, when an
illegal substance is found, their rights have been violated. As the
Court brushes away any attempts by defendants to argue that
dogs should not be relied on unless there is proof that they have
high rates of accuracy,239 the pedestrian faces an uphill battle,
requiring a defendant to prove that (1) the Court should not rely
on the dog in the first place, and (2) if the dog was not trusted,
because it is known to be unreliable, then the illegal substance
in question would never have been found. Government
acknowledgment of pedestrians’ expectation of privacy would
provide higher safeguards and alleviate some of the burden that
the pedestrian holds—for it would guard pedestrians from being
violated by inaccurate dogs in the first place and would force
the hand of the government to improve these procedures.
The fact that the government has not acknowledged the
equality between the expectation of privacy for the pedestrian
and the passenger in a vehicle is especially troublesome
because when a pedestrian is approached by an officer who
requests permission to conduct a dog sniff, this pedestrian is
effectively forced to either stop and comply with the sniff, or
239 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (where the Court
disregarded the respondent’s argument that it should not rely on these sniffs because
dogs have proven to be unreliable).
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refuse—thereby inducing reasonable suspicion in the mind of
the officer to conduct a pat down of her anyway. For example,
in Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court explained that although
merely standing in an area of high criminal activity would not
be enough to create reasonable suspicion, “evasive behavior,”
such as running away or intentionally and obviously avoiding
police officers is “a pertinent factor in determining reasonable
suspicion.”240 Further, the reasonable suspicion induced by the
pedestrian’s refusal would comply with that required in Terry,
and therefore, a pat down stemming from it would be
constitutional.241 If the random sniffs by canines assured accuracy,
there would be no danger in pat downs or searches of pedestrians
based solely on their alerts, as this would create proper probable
cause, a standard higher than the reasonable suspicion required
under Terry. Without any guarantee whatsoever that the probable
cause created by an alert was based on the scent of drugs, those
pedestrians subject to a subsequent search by a human officer
have been stripped of their Fourth Amendment protections.
Therefore, the government must take the first step to mitigate
this issue, by acknowledging that pedestrians are entitled to a
moderate expectation of privacy.
B.

The Temporary Presumption Against Sniffs Not
Supported by Prior Reasonable Suspicion

Because the current system violates privacy protections
owed to pedestrians under the Fourth Amendment, it cannot
continue unless and until improved. That is why a temporary
presumption against canine sniffs as they are currently utilized
is necessary, until the training system is standardized and
improved, so as to ensure accuracy in alerts. Specifically, the
presumption should weigh against the constitutionality of
canine sniffs not backed by prior human reasonable suspicion.
Creation of this temporary presumption would uphold the rights
of pedestrians that are afforded through Terry—and that should
be afforded equally through Prouse, Caballes, and Rodriguez—
by guaranteeing that stops, pat downs, searches, and seizures
of people on the street are based on more than mere randomness
or an officer’s hunch. The risk of a violation of pedestrians’ rights
through a false alert based on handler cues would be avoided. By
defaulting to the Terry standard, pedestrians would enjoy strong
protection against sniffs, while the government gains time to
240
241

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27–29 (1968).
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create a more permanent solution. A pedestrian’s expectation of
privacy, therefore, would be equally protected against both
human and canine intrusions.
A temporary presumption against the constitutionality
of street sniffs that are not supported by prior human reasonable
suspicion functions as a holdover, which would guarantee
pedestrians the safeguards that they are entitled to because
they hold a moderate expectation of privacy. Though members of
the K9 force have been shown to be helpful to the police force, this
is not a reason to violate the rights of pedestrians. A permanent
solution may take time, but due to the nature of the loss of
privacy rights that is taking place, the government must take
action now to stop these types of searches that lack probable
cause. This presumption would terminate once dog sniffs are
more highly regulated and proven to be more accurate. This
affords the government the time necessary to create heightened
training and accuracy requirements and standards.
C.

Curbing Subconscious Cues Through Standardized
Training

Because pedestrians should be afforded the same privacy
rights as those in a vehicle, it is not necessarily true that sniffs
should never take place. In a vehicle, sniffs are permissible once
an officer has stopped a car based on reasonable suspicion.242 In
contrast, the requirement that an officer have reasonable
suspicion to stop an individual is much less effective in a
situation involving a pedestrian, because a dog may sniff anyone
who walks past it and an officer will not always need to stop an
individual before he allows the canine to sniff her—as
demonstrated by the story about Jane Doe.243 However,
improvements in the accuracy of canine alerts would make the
impossibility of this particular safeguard irrelevant, as the
dangers associated with handler cues would be eliminated—or
at least reduced—and, therefore, subsequent stops, pat downs,
seizures, and searches would be based on honest and legitimate
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as appropriate. This
would serve to equalize the reasonable expectation of privacy of
all pedestrians—whether faced with a member of the police
force on two or four legs.244
See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–10 (2005).
See supra Introduction.
244 Recall that in Terry, the Court held that human officers must have
reasonable suspicion prior to conducting a search of a pedestrian. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
242

243
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The government must work to standardize training
requirements for canine officers and their human partners.
Paul Waggoner, a member of Auburn University’s detector-dog
research program has explained that “[t]raining is the key to
eliminating accidental cues and false alerts.”245 The government
must first recognize the problem, so that new training systems
may target precisely what leads to inaccurate alerts. Yet, the
government fails to acknowledge the danger and prevalence of
handler cues, even though reports and lower courts have
indicated that this is a growing problem.246
Because under the current system training programs
across each state are not standardized,247 each police department
and training center develops its own methods to ensure that
dogs and handlers can work together.248 Critics of this
inconsistent system have commented that many dogs and
handlers leave these programs without the training that is
crucial for the position at hand.249 Many argue that training
should focus on the elimination of the influence of handlers
over the dogs and their alerts.250 Other critics argue that more
emphasis should be placed on how dogs learn from humans, so
that the dogs learn how to properly respond even when the
human officer acts improperly.251 Regardless, in creating
standardized training that focuses on conscious and subconscious
cues by handlers, the issue of human influence over dogs’ alerts
will be largely abated.
While various scholars have suggested that training
should be standardized,252 few have offered more than general
ideas as to how training may be enhanced overall. After
completing her 2010 study,253 Lisa Lit explained that “[p]eople
use an array of [training] techniques, and depending on who
Hinkel & Mahr, supra note 33.
See supra Part IV (describing the high levels of inaccuracy in police dog alerts).
247 Hinkel & Mahr, supra note 33. Robert C. Bird commented on the fact that
even when there are specific requirements in place for the training of dogs, there are no
such standards for the human handlers when it comes to interpreting a dog’s signals.
Bird, supra note 45, at 422–25.
248 Training programs often list this realistic-scenario training as part of the
program. See, e.g., Bird, supra note 35, at 413–14.
249 Hinkel & Mahr, supra note 33.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 See, e.g., Dave Hunter, Common Scents: Establishing a Presumption of
Reliability for Detector Dog Teams Used in Airports in Light of the Current Terrorist
Threats, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 89, 98, 108–09 (2002); Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs
and Probable Cause, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 33 (2006); Mark E. Smith, Comment,
Going to the Dogs: Evaluating the Proper Standard for Narcotic Detector Dog Searches of
Private Residences, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 103, 137 (2009).
253 For a full description of this study, see Lit et al., supra note 214.
245
246
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you talk to, their method will be the best method . . . [but] there is
not much data to support one training method over another.”254
Regardless, many scholars and critics have offered solutions that
they believe will at least target the problem. Some have argued
that it would be helpful to implement “double-blind” trials
whereby the handler and dog enter a room to see if they detect
an illegal substance, while neither of them know whether there
is a substance in the room.255 This it not used by most training
centers or organizations; most of them instead conduct “singleblind evaluations,” whereby the handler is notified that there is a
substance in the room that the dog should alert to.256 Utilizing
double-blind trials will help the handlers become aware of the
possibility that he is cueing his dog by accident.
Videotaping may be an effective addition to the doubleblind tests. After concluding her study, Lit explained that she
did not implement videotaping of the experiment though this
would have allowed her to better study the way that humans
were cueing to their dogs.257 She also stated that she hopes to
recreate the experiment with the implementation of videotaping
to study precisely what cues humans are giving the dogs.258
Taping and rewatching handler-canine pairs in action, Lit
argues, will permit those watching to understand the prevalent
issues.259 Because handler cues are often “subtle human
cues . . . including pointing, nodding, head-turning and gazing,”260
these actions can easily be watched and rewatched on tape,
allowing individuals to study their actions and learn from their
mistakes. Notably, not all training centers and organizations
require that handlers be videotaped during their training
sessions. Though some scholars have played with the idea of
requiring that officers videotape every sniff conducted,261
videotaping in training sessions is a more functional alternative
to this, as it is a proactive method in which the government can
determine which handlers and canines from the K9 force have
low accuracy rates before allowing them to conduct sniffs outside
of the training center. This higher emphasis on how handlers
Lee, supra note 38.
Id.
256 Id.
257 Explosive- and Drug-Sniffing Dogs’ Performance Is Affected by Their
Handlers’ Beliefs, U.C. DAVIS HEALTH (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/
publish/news/newsroom/4968 [https://perma.cc/4ANX-67JJ].
258 Id.
259 Id. (quoting Lisa Lit as saying, “[t]his study should be replicated and expanded
so that we can assess hidden cues handlers might be giving”).
260 Id.
261 See, e.g., Myers II, supra note 252, at 33–34 & n.178.
254
255
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and dogs work together, and on what level of influence handlers
have on dogs during training, will lead to a better understanding
of accidental handler cues, and a better grasp on how to avoid
them, by allowing handlers who cue to their dogs subconsciously
to have the opportunity to observe and study their actions and
movements, and thus become conscious of their cues.
To be sure, this system may not curb the prevalence of a
handler consciously cueing its dog to alert to drugs, for these
handlers may ace the trial but choose to act improperly once
out in the real world. For this reason, the government would
need to invest in not merely proactive measures, but also
retroactive measures, such as a threshold accuracy requirement
for all handler-dog pairs.
D.

Curbing Conscious Cues Through an Accuracy
Threshold Requirement

In a perfect world, implementing proactive measures alone
would counter the problem at hand. However, standardized
training alone cannot account for the inevitable possibility that
some officers may choose to take advantage of their power. The
government must therefore ensure that the heightened training
standards are put to good use.
Some scholars have suggested that recordkeeping
requirements be put into place to maintain the accuracy of canine
officers.262 However, more must be done to assure that human
officers intentionally cueing their dogs face consequences for
violating pedestrians’ rights. Although recordkeeping is important,
it alone does not offer a solution to the fact that a large percentage
of dogs alert inaccurately. There must be a consequence to reinforce
the importance of accurate alerts. Therefore, along with the
recordkeeping, the government must initiate a standard threshold
accuracy requirement that handler-canine pairs must meet. Pairs
that do not meet the required accuracy level would need to be
either retrained, or removed from the K9 unit altogether.
Previously, in Florida v. Harris, the Supreme Court held
that a state cannot require that a detection dog meet
requirements from a checklist created by the state to be
considered accurate enough to create probable cause.263 The
Court held that this type of formulation would violate the
“totality of the circumstances” test that is generally used for the
probable cause analysis, particularly because it is not a flexible
262
263

See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 252, at 96, 108–09.
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1056 (2013).
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standard.264 However, creating a standard percentage is not the
same as creating a checklist with specific requirements.265 The
extreme level of flexibility permitted by the Court is precisely
the piece of the puzzle that is allowing handler cues to continue
to exist. Further, it is important to note that this particular
required percentage is not one that plays a role in the
admissibility of evidence—which is what the Court concentrated
on in its decision in Harris.266 Instead, this percentage will be
used only to determine whether dog-handler pairs are adequate
to remain in the K9 force. The “totality of the circumstances”
formulation is used for determining probable cause—not for
determining whether a dog or human is fit for employment with
the police academy.
This requirement would eliminate the possibility that
after being trained more thoroughly, officers who are not up to
the task might continue to violate Fourth Amendment rights of
pedestrians, as it would specifically target those officers who
are incapable of learning to control their cues through training,
as well as those officers who make the affirmative choice not to
do so. There is no valuable reason that handler-canine teams
who often alert inaccurately should be kept in the force. Not
only does allowing them to stay waste police funding and time,
but it continues to subject citizens to privacy violations.
While it is easy to say that the threshold percentage for
accuracy should be high, it is not as simple to say exactly what
the percentage should be. Officers must be afforded at least
some room for mistakes. Just as officers who initiate Terry
stops may be incorrect in believing that a pedestrian is
carrying drugs or a weapon, dogs too make errors. However,
regardless of where the threshold begins, it should serve only
as a starting point. As the standardization of training for
handler-canine pairs continues to improve, the percentage
threshold requirement for accuracy should increase with each
year. Therefore, even if the government begins with the Seventh
Circuit’s “good enough” standard at 59.5% accuracy,267 this
would only continue to improve. The point of the threshold is to
hold officers to a standard so that they may not take advantage
of the system, as well as to define clear consequences for those
Id.
For example, the Court rejected a proposed requirement that instructed:
“an alert cannot establish probable cause under the [the state] court’s decision unless
the State introduces comprehensive documentation of the dog’s prior ‘hits’ and ‘misses’
in the field.” Id.
266 Id.
267 United States v. Bentley, 795 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015).
264
265
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who do. It is fair to assume that this is the type of regulation
that the Seventh Circuit was discussing in Bentley when it
referred to its hope that officers would “improve the quality of
training and the reliability of the[ir] animals,”268 which has not,
as of yet, been implemented.
Through the government’s acknowledgment of a
pedestrian’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the temporary
presumption, proactive training standardization, and a retroactive
accuracy threshold requirement, pedestrians’ privacy rights will be
maintained and protected, while still allowing the government to
utilize the canine’s nose.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated.”269 In guaranteeing all citizens the right to certain
privacy,270 the amendment ensures the security and safety of
individuals under the Constitution. A citizen’s sense of privacy
is a crucial piece of human development and interaction.271
Therefore, government intrusion into privacy rights risks
compromising the value of one’s everyday life.
The current system—which continues to allow street
sniffs of pedestrians to remain wholly unregulated—disregards
privacy rights that are in fact held by the individual. The
rationales that support the standard of privacy owed to a person
in a vehicle are present in the analysis to determine the level of
privacy owed to a pedestrian. Therefore, both a pedestrian on foot
subject to a search of her person, and a person in a car subject to
a search of her vehicle, should be entitled to the same protections.
As the Court has indicated, a government interest in safety
cannot be achieved through means that utterly violate an

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
270 See What Does the Fourth Amendment Mean?, supra note 66; see also Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (stating that although the Fourth Amendment
should not be understood as a “general constitutional right to privacy,” the Amendment
nonetheless can be said to stand to “protect[ ] individual privacy against certain kinds of
governmental intrusion,” though some of the protections of the Fourth Amendment can
be said to go even further beyond the issue of privacy).
271 See Lauren McCormick, The Internet and Social Media Sites: A Shift in Privacy
Norms Resulting in the Exploitation and Abuse of Adolescents and Teens in Dating
Relationships, 7 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 591, 593 (2014) (arguing that “[t]he importance of
privacy extends to every facet of our lives, as it gives us the power to determine what
information we allow people to have access to”).
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individual’s expectation of privacy.272 The current regime, however,
persists in doing just that—by permitting sniffs to circumvent
established laws. Therefore, the government must improve the
level of accuracy of the sniffs that currently have the power to
invade individuals’ right to privacy, to thereby maintain the
purpose, meaning, and importance of the Fourth Amendment.
Jacey Lara Gottlieb†

272 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979) (holding that
even when an officer has a reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, this does not mean
that the individual in the vehicle has lost “all reasonable expectation of privacy simply
because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation,” and further
commenting on other cases that have limited stops, seizures, and searches, so that
individuals are not “shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection” just because they are
in a particular location or are acting in a certain manner).
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